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Abstract
While tari¤ and quota barriers in agricultural, food and manufactured products
have been declining due to the proliferation of multilateral trade agreements, there is
increasing debate regarding the impact of product and process standards and technical
regulations, since they may have become a subtler form of protection. One of the
possible e¤ects of increasing standards in developing countries is that it may a¤ect
the size of the exporting sector, with adverse e¤ects on labor markets. We test such
e¤ect for the case of Argentina using rm level data for the manufacturing sector. We
nd evidence of a reduction in export shares due to an increase in standard stringency.
Moreover, there is an increase in the skill ratio for exporting rms. The overall e¤ect
of standard stringency on average wages of exporting rms is negative, supporting the
idea that lower net producer prices, due to a higher cost of standard compliance, are
passed on to workers.
1 Introduction
The capability of developing countries to engage in international trade is conditioned by
rich country policies. Trade barriers arise from direct interventions in the price determi-
nation process, either through the application of tari¤s, quotas or subsidies to exports or
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2production, or through the application of standards and regulations. As tari¤ and quota
barriers to trade in agricultural, food, and manufactured products continue to decline due
to the proliferation of multilateral trade agreements, increasing public debate is taking place
regarding the impact of product and process standards and technical regulations. Standards
and regulations have become a more common, though subtler, form of protection.
This a particularly relevant matter for Argentina, where the poverty headcount currently
is 26.9%1, and where the scope for inward-looking development strategies is rather limited.
In 2005 Argentina exported only 14.14% of its GDP in constant pesos. Up to May 2006,
total exports in nominal values have grown about 60.8% since the large devaluation of
the peso in January 2002. While this numbers may look impressive, they are somehow
disappointing when compared to and increase of 81% for total world trade and 120% for
the case of Brazil.
The performance of Argentinas exports shows that the requirements for Argentine rms
to enter export markets in industrialized countries largely exceeds competitive costs. In-
deed, a business survey conducted by IERAL in 2004 has shown that the compliance with
standards and technical regulations in the North requires setup costs that may prevent the
entry of a large number of potentially exporting rms, specially SMEs and that may raise
variable costs of production for those who export, with a negative impact on their export
share. These costs come from setting up a quality control and management system, from the
adoption of new testing procedures, from product and process re-designs, from investment
in additional plant and equipment and from costly search of information.2
This means that standards in rich countries, regardless of their reasonability, may be
imposing barriers to entry into industrialized countriesmarkets that in turn generate a
segmentation of production between exporting and non-exporting rms in developing coun-
tries. It has been documented that exporting rms have higher productivity and thus, pay
higher wages. These rms also tend to display higher quality standards. In general, only the
1This gure corresponds to 2006
2 In a developing country like Argentina, the cost of installing a quality control system may reach dollars
37,000, the costs of calibration amount to dollars 3,000, the costs associated to testing procedures may
represent up to 1% of the unit production costs, and the costs of investing in additional equipment like
lling machines with precision scales may cost up to dollars 250,000. These represent very high costs for
most Argentine SMEs, especially in the current context of lack of institutional nancing of investment (the
stock of banking credit to the private non-nancial sector is less than 10% of GDP).
3most productive rms in a developing country like Argentina enter the export market (to
industrialized countries), producing better quality goods for export than for the domestic
markets in order to supply richer developed country consumers. For example, segmentation
can occur even within a same rm, where there are di¤erent quality in products as docu-
mented in Verhoogen (2004) for the Volkswagen plant in Mexico.3 This segmentation in
production has signicant e¤ects on the labor markets, where workers employed in export-
ing rms get higher wages and workers employed in non-exporting rms get lower wages. In
this setup, more stringent standards are likely to exacerbate the segmentation in production
and, through its e¤ects on the labor market, lead to bigger inter-rm wage inequality and
to possible employment problems if the size of the exporting sector is reduced. Addition-
ally, compliance with standards is likely to be skill-intensive, thus leading to a bigger skill
premium.
The aim of this paper is to appraise to what extent the standards and technical regu-
lations imposed by the US and the EU may result in a bigger segmentation of production
and lower export shares, with a negative direct e¤ect on employment and an increase of
intra and inter rm wage inequality.
In the next section we provide a more thorough description and discussion of the evo-
lution and rationale for standards and technical regulations in the world and why it is a
relevant matter for Argentina. This section generates the hypotheses to test the e¤ects of
standards on exports, employment and wages. Sections ?? and ?? describe the proposed
methodology for testing these hypotheses and the methodology we will use. Section ??
describes the data bases that we intend to use. Section ?? presents the results. Finally ??
shows our conclusions.
3Volkswagen produces two di¤erent line of products: one the model of the original beetle" for the
Mexican market and newer and more expensive models for export.
42 OECD policies: Standards and technical regulations
2.1 Standards and technical regulations in industrialized countries
Standards and technical regulations, be it for products, labor, or for the environment, are
applied to mitigate against health and environmental risks, to prevent deceptive practices,
and to reduce transaction costs in business by providing common reference points for notions
of quality, safety, authenticity, good practice, and sustainability(World Bank4).
Standards are specications that relates to product attributes. They can take di¤erent
forms. Henson (2004) classies them as:
 Terminology standards (e.g. units of measurement)
 Basic standards (e.g. tolerance)
 Dimensional standards (for compatibility, e.g. units of electric motors)
 Performance standards (e.g. minimum durability of light bulbs)
 Variety reduction standards (e.g. standard screw size)
 Testing and quality control standards (e.g. methods to determine protein content of
animal feed)
Distinction can also be made between standards that relate to process and production
methods (PPM) and to products. Product standards focus on characteristics of the nal
product (size, composition, function, safety, etc) whereas PPM address the way in which a
product is made.5
Standards can also di¤er in freedom of choice regarding compliance. They can be
mandatory (legally) or they can be voluntary. Mandatory standards are known as tech-
nical regulations and they are set by public institutions (regulatory agencies). Compliance
of mandatory standards is obligatory. They are usually related to safety and health, when
there is asymmetric information and the buyer can either not assess reliably the safety of
the product or it can only do it at a very high cost. Voluntary standards arise from a
4www.worldbank.org
5Examples of such certications are ISO 9001, IS0 14001, HACCP for food industry, etc.
5coordinated process, mainly of private organizations or they arise form an uncoordinated
process of market - based competition (de facto mandatory standards).
Usually, in the early stages of economic development, standards are mandatory and set
by public institutions. As an economy develops, voluntary public standards and private
standards become widespread. In developed economies, most private standards become de
facto mandatory established by market competition.
Depending upon the particular industry or market circumstances, standards and techni-
cal regulations can either raise or lower economic e¢ ciency; promote or block competition;
facilitate or constrain international trade; and enable or exclude the participation of the
poor in remunerative economic activities.
Mandatory standards are regulated by WTO to guarantee they only impede trade to
achieve a legitimate objective and that they if they do it, it is in the least trade-distortive
manner. The 1947 GATT accord allowed the use of minimum standards to protect hu-
man, animal and plant health, as well as bring order to the market. The World Trade
Organization (WTO) established that standards can di¤er from internationally accepted
levels only when there is scientic evidence supporting the decision. At multilateral level,
there are two binding WTO agreements which intend to limit abusive uses of standards
for protection purposes. These are: the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement) and the WTO Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (the TBT Agreement).6
6World Trade Organization Agreements: The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS) entered into
force on 1 January 1995 and allows members to take scientically based measures to protect public health.
The agreement covers standards which are related to animals, plant material, and human health. The agree-
ment commits members to base these measures on internationally established guidelines and risk assessment
procedures. In the case of particularly stringent measures, countries must present scientic justication.
When existing scientic evidence is insu¢ cient to determine risk, members may adopt measures on the ba-
sis of available information, but must obtain additional information to objectively ground their assessment
of risk within a reasonable period of time. Generally speaking, the SPS Agreement is a compromise that
permits countries to take measures to protect public health within their borders so long as they do so in a
manner that restricts trade as little as possible. The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT) strikes a
delicate balance between the policy goals of trade facilitation and national autonomy in technical regulations.
The agreement attempts to extricate the trade-facilitating aspects of standards from their trade-distorting
potential by obligating countries to ensure that technical regulations and product standards do not unnec-
essarily restrict international trade. The agreement covers mandatory provisions of government technical
regulations that specify products characteristics or their related processes and production methods. The
TBT Agreement works toward this end in three ways. The agreement encourages standard equivalence
between countries, in other words, the formal acceptance of the standards of other countries through explicit
agreements. It also promotes the use of international standards. It mandates that countries establish enquiry
points and national notication authorities (the two may be the same body) in order to answer questions
6Although the accords expressly stated that standards should not be used as covert forms
of protectionism, sometimes protection is the only goal of the standard. They usually apply
to both national and foreign production, and thus do not correspond to the classical form of
protectionism which openly discriminate against imports. However, in practice, standards
and technical regulations may be used strategically to enhance the competitive position of
countries or individual rms. Standards and technical regulations can potentially impede
international trade, for example, by imposing unnecessary costly and time consuming tests
or by laying out unjustied di¤erent requirements in di¤erent markets. As traditional trade
barriers to trade have fallen, these non-tari¤ barriers have become of particular concern
to rms in developing countries, which may bear relatively larger costs in meeting their
requirements than their counterparts in developed nations.
A greater number and wider range of standards are being implemented globally. Noti-
cations of TBT and SPS measures has increased markedly since between 2005 and 1995.
SPS notications grew 658% and TBT notications, 315%. Certications of processes of
quality assurance, ISO 9000 series of standards on quality management systems and ISO
14000 series on environmental management systems, are becoming widespread in both in-
dustrialized and developing countries and has become a de-facto requirement. Besides, as
standards apply to either product characteristics, quality control systems and processes by
which they are manufactured, provided and distributed, many standards might apply to a
single product.
Measuring the e¤ect of standards on trade is a di¢ cult task because of the complex
nature of standards. Exporters might gain competitive advantage from complying with the
standards and might, in the end, gain market share. Still, compliance costs are far from
unimportant. Moreover, a wide range of standards might apply to the same product.
Compliance costs usually have a xed component, associated with redesigning needs and
measured as the investment required for compliance, and a variable cost that results from
about SPS regulations and notify other nations of new regulations respectively. Enquiry points compile all
available information in that country on product standards and trade regulations and provide it to other
members upon request. The national notication authorities report changes in trade policy to the WTO
and receive and take comments on these measures. To sum up, the SPS and TBT Agreements limit the
scope for importing countries to impose arbitrary and unjustied requirements on exports from LDCs and
encourage the use of internationally developed standards as the safety/quality reference for products moving
in world trade irrespective of the supplier. It also establishes dispute settlement mechanisms and panels.
7altering capital and labor usages to meet the recurring costs of complying. They might vary
widely, from country to country and from industry to industry and between di¤erent types of
standards. This will depend on the prevailing structure and conditions of the supply chain,
the extent of private-public and private-private cooperation, domestic capacity, level of
development of the export industry and so on. Equally important, compliance costs include
not only the cost of meeting the technical requirement, but also the cost of verifying that the
requirement is met, known as the conformity assessment. Often, the conformity assessment
represents the largest barrier to trade. All these will determine if only incremental changes
are needed or if major adjustment to meet the standards are required. In accomplishing
standards exporters face administrative, technical and nancial burden that might act as an
entry barrier for individual suppliers, mainly small scale. This complex nature of inuence
of standards on trade impedes generalization, and evidence remains based on case studies
and specic measurements. The World Bank conducted a survey over 689 rms and 17
developing countries inquiring on di¤erent regulatory requirements to globally investigate
the impacts of technical requirements7. The survey helps appraise the incremental cost
of standard compliance as a proportion of sales by industry, as shown in Table 2 in the
appendix.
Unlike tari¤s, trade barriers due to standards and regulations have di¤erentiated e¤ect
on the decision to enter a market, depending on rms characteristics. A key di¤erence
between both kind of protections may be that tari¤s a¤ect how much to import whereas
xed costs of compliance due to standards may a¤ect the decision whether to export or not.
Maskus et al. (2004) nd that bigger set-up costs associated to more severe standards also
raise variable costs of production, thus acting as import taxes as well.
Chen et al (2004) nd that technical regulations in developed countries adversely a¤ect
rms propensity to export in developing countries. Besides, they also nd empirical evi-
dence that standards and testing procedures impede exportermarket entry, reducing the
likelihood of exporting to multiple countries.
Hence, harmful e¤ects of standards seem to have particular incidence on developing
countries whereas benets are mainly accrued by developed economies. This unbalanced
7 see Wilson et al. 2004.
8impact between developed and developing economies might be explained by the xed costs
imposed by meeting standards. These costs associated with foreign standards and technical
requirements may be born publicly or privately. Usually, developing countries do not have
adequate public testing capacity due to lack of public resources and they also face di¢ culties
in collective action. As a result, costs of compliance are mainly borne by individual rms
and, consequently, impede access to rms from developing countries, particularly smaller
rms.8
Additionally, there are a proliferation of Mutual Recognition Agreements on standards
and regulations aiming at harmonization or mutual recognition of national standards that
also aim at facilitating trade between nations and countries, but mainly developed ones,
which further excludes developing economies.9
Accordingly, accomplishing with international standards require additional e¤orts which
might be impossible to a¤ord in developing economies. As an example, Finger and Shuler
show that the World Bank spent between 1991 and 1996 US$ 82.7 millions in Argentina
in a project to assist in the implementation of sanitary and phytosanitary regulations.
Consequently, imposing standards may generate development problems. Even though under
the WTO agreements (SPS, TBT, TRIPS) these regulations should be implemented in
manners that restrict trade as little as possible and preserve health and safety, they might
disguise protective measures as protection from specic risks.
2.2 From trade liberalization to standards and technical regulations
It is mostly agreed that trade related standards and technical regulations have risen in im-
portance over tari¤s as means of trade protection. The application of product regulation
and standards is becoming increasingly contentious as an implicit non-tari¤ barrier to trade
(Maskus, Wilson and Otsuki, 2001). Even though WTO agreements (TBT and SPS) have
increased transparency in regulatory systems and promoted conformity to international
8One example is given by the investment in equipment used to test for electromagnetic interference
in electrical machinery which amounts US$ 1 million and is rendered obsolete every time the technical
regulations in this area are changed, which happens very often.
9A noteworthy example is provided by some wineries in Argentina, which sell wine to most developed
countries (including the US, England and Japan), but not to Germany because of a stringent regulation on
the precise blend of grapes for producing wine. This standard does not operate however for US wineries
exporting to Germany because of a Mutual Recognition of Standards Agreement.
9standards, they remain a main concern specially for developing countries. Moreover, in
developing countries, development issues on certication capacity building arise and inter-
national aid is required to build local capacity to meet standards. However, there still are
many unknowns to determine the economic impact of regulations and conformity assess-
ment requirements. As a result, it is di¢ cult to establish negotiation priorities and policy
trade-o¤s. In this section we draw on the main conclusions of the discussion in Maskus
and Wilson (2001), where they present an overview of the policy debate around technical
barriers to trade and product standards. As it has been mentioned above, non-tari¤ barriers
have signicant e¤ects on developing countries, which may incur in additional costs in order
to meet them.
The economic impact of di¤ering regulations and conformity assessment requirements
directly a¤ect trade policy choices and success or failure of liberalization e¤orts. Thus
empirical work on standards is crucial.
One of the more important conclusions of their work is the need to develop empirical
analysis of the e¤ects of standards on trade. For that, they recommend the following steps,
1. availability of rm level surveys in developing countries
2. devising methods for assessing how standards can restrict trade in developing countries
3. which econometrics approaches can be used to micro data to see the e¤ect of standards
on exports.
According to Wilson (1999), developing countries members of the WTO have made
standards and TBT a priority in the trade agenda post- Seattle. Among the key points raised
by these members are both technical assistance in order to implement WTO obligations on
standards and concerns over the use of environmental regulations by developed countries as
motives to block imports.
While there is not a specic year to which we can say that standard requirement signif-
icantly started to a¤ect export decisions to the EU and US, according to Maskus, Wilson
and Otsuki (2001) 1995 can be considered the year in which claims of violation of various
provisions of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade to the WTO started to increase
10
and since that year there was a marked raise in the number of trade disputes over stan-
dards, mainly under the SPS agreement. These claims to violations plus the increase in the
number of notications of TBT and SPS measures to WTO appear to be the only proxy
available so far of the increase use of standards and technical regulations as protectionist
devices following the multilateral tari¤ reduction under the Uruguay Round of the WTO.
And both point at 1995.
3 Evolution of exports and standards in Argentina
After the 2001 crisis, most of private investment in Argentina has been directed towards
expanding production for the domestic market rather than improving quality. The amount
of investment directed towards improving product quality was reduced from 43.6% in 2001
to 20.8% in 2006 as it can be observed in Table ??.
While total investment has recovered from pre-crisis levels, its composition has changed.
There is a much higher participation of residential and public investment on total invest-
ment, concentrated in non exporting sectors.10
This lower investment in quality is consistent with the fact that although exports of
manufacturing products are showing a more dynamic behavior than before the crisis, the
countries of destination of such exports generally demand lower quality than the EU and
US.
Graph I shows the relation existing between industrial exports and ISO 9000 certica-
tion. While the ISO 9000 certications are certications of quality management systems and
not of product quality, they can be considered a good proxy for the latter, since generally
both go hand in hand.
Any increase in standard stringency, as it has been happening in developed countries in
recent years, may have the short run e¤ect of discouraging the already sluggish behavior
of Argentine exports to the EU and US. In Table ?? we can observe the cost faced by
Latin American companies of di¤erent industries in order to full with quality requirements
and technical regulations demanded by OECD countries. Finally, we can appraise the
10For a more detailed description of investment patterns in Argentina after the 2001 crisis, see Sanchez
and Butler (2007).
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incremental cost of complying with specic standards in order to export to US and EU for
Argentine rms as obtained from Sanchez and Butler (2005) in Table ??.
Such costs include ISO type environmental and product certications, and the cost of
investing in quality development. As it can be observed, such costs are far from negligible
and they are proportionally higher the smaller the size and scale of the rm.
Finally, we would like to show some statistical di¤erences between human capital indi-
cators of exporting vs. non exporting rms. As shown Table ??, average wages in exporting
industries are 18% higher than in the non-exporting sector. Also, labor informality rates
(which bear a high correlation with poverty through lower wages) are higher in the non
exporting sector. Lastly, standard estimation of Mincer (see Table ??) equations show
that returns to schooling and experience are much higher in the exporting than in the non
exporting sector.
4 Testable hypotheses
From the previous sections we can suggest several hypotheses which could be tested. More
stringent standards will have e¤ects on exports, employment, skill intensity and wages at
the rm level. For example, we could conjecture the following e¤ects of an increase in
standard stringency:
1. The participation of exports to industrialized countries on total exports and output
will decline.
2. Bigger xed costs of compliance will increase the probability of switching from export-
ing to industrialized countries to exporting to other countries, or to non-exporting.
3. Employment of unskilled labor in rms exporting to industrialized countries will
decline, as a result of their bigger skill intensities and reduced output.
4. The e¤ect on skilled labor will be ambiguous for these rms, since products complying
with standards require higher skill intensity but such exports may fall.
5. Total employment of exporting rms will decline.
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6. The skill intensity of employment will go up for exporting rms, as standard compli-
ance is skill intensive.
7. Average wages will increase for these rms, raising interrm wage inequality.
Unfortunately, data limitations -which will be explained in the next section- allow us
just to test three hypotheses of the ones mentioned above:11
1. The participation of exports on total output will decline.
2. The skill intensity of employment will go up for exporting rms.
3. Average wages will increase for these rms as a result of the bigger skill intensity of
standard compliance.
5 Testing methodology
In order to test the rst hypothesis we could use panel data from the National Survey on
FirmsInnovation and Technological Behavior 12 at the rm level for 1992, 1996, 1998 and
2001. We have information on expenditure in general certications such as ISO 9001, sector
specic certications and environmental certications and many other rm characteristics as
well. While the variables accounting for product certication can be considered as proxies
for standard compliance, we come across a problem of endogeneity, since almost surely
companies already exporting spent more on standards in the past. Moreover, the number
of observations for product certication is small.
In order to overcome these problems, we suggest a di¤erent approach for estimation:
as mentioned in the previous section, around 1995 standards became signicantly more
stringent and thus we may assume that there is some sort of structural change in standards
requirement at some point around that time. If we work with data corresponding to 1992 and
11Data availability imposed serious limitations for testing our priors. In particular, the number of obser-
vations for rms exporting to industrialized countries did not have good information about cost of standard
compliance at the rm level. Neither the role of entry/exit could not be assessed with the data available,
since there were too few observations to perform this analysis. Information about the level of skills for each
rm workers was also limited, being the skill ratio the only information available. Finally, as far as wages
are concerned there was only information on average wages.
12The contents of this survey are explained in the next section
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2001, we can resort to methodologies that are generally used for program evaluation, using
a Di¤erence in Di¤erence estimator.13 In this sense, our priors indicate that an increase
in standards imposed by EU and US will have no direct e¤ect on Argentine companies
who devote their production to the internal market or who sell their exports to other
destinations like Mercosur. However, it will have some e¤ect on the ones exporting to the
US and the EU. In this sense we can dene a treatment (companies exporting to the EU
and US) and a control group (companies exporting to Mercosur) and see the e¤ect of the
treatment (structural change in standard requirements) on export shares. In order to do
that, we estimate a DID estimator which is equivalent to a two dimensional xed e¤ects
panel estimation that can be specied as follows:
Yit = Iit + Xit + t + i + "it (1)
where Yit are export shares of rm i at period t, Iit is a binary variable which takes the
value one for companies su¤ering the stringency in standards at year t and zero otherwise,
Xit is a vector of rm and time specic variables, t is a common e¤ect for all rms which
varies over time,i is a rm specic time invariant xed e¤ect. Finally, "it is an error,
independent of xed and trend e¤ects. (Chamberlain 1984).
In this estimation,  measures the e¤ect of changing standards on export shares. Our
hypothesis is that this coe¢ cient is negative.14
In order to test the second and the third hypotheses, where we measure the e¤ect of
changing standards on employment and wages we must overcome the problem of estimating
jointly wage equations and labor demands, which requires a GE model, which goes beyond
the scope of this research project.
13For robustness, we tried to split the sample in di¤erent periods, 1992-1996 and 1998-2001 and found no
e¤ects of standards, which supports our priors that the structural change took place around 1995. Results
of these estimations are available upon request.
14While it can be argued that Iit may be endogenous, reecting the fact that it represents rms decision
to stay in the export markets, we did not nd many observations in our sample which dropped the EU
and US as main destination all over the period analyzed. This somehow supports the idea that standard
stringency may be causing marginal e¤ects on export shares, but not entry/exit decisions. If this were the
case and there were some valid instrument for Iit, our experiment would be calculating a lower bound for
the e¤ect of standard stringecy on export shares.
14
We again use a similar DID approach as we did in the rst hypothesis. For the labor
demand equations, we will use the adequate IV procedure, as we will explain below, in order
to overcome the endogeneity problem (we use as an IV for wages the average sector wage).
Finally, labor demand is a function of rm characteristics and of instrumented wages, where
we want to see the e¤ect of changing standards.
6 Datasets
6.1 The World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade Survey
The World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade Survey was the rst attempt to investigate the
impacts of technical requirements on trade on a set of developing countries across regions,
including Argentina. The intent of the survey was to solicit information from agricultural,
manufacturing, and trade rms in developing countries regarding technical barriers en-
countered in major export markets that impact trade facilitation, and the costs associated
with meeting standards and regulatory requirements. Information on technical regulations
specic to ve major exports markets also enables comparisons of the stringency and impor-
tance of standard and technical regulations by exports markets such as the European Union,
United States, Japan, Canada, and Australia. The data are also relevant to investigate of
the role of the Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) to promote trade. The Survey in-
cludes information on countries such as Argentina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Chile,
Honduras, Panama, Iran, Jordan, India, Pakistan, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal,
South Africa, and Uganda. The ndings of the Survey can be used in our current frame-
work, to extend our between and within sector analysis to a between and within country
analysis.
6.2 National Survey on FirmsInnovation and Technological Behavior
The National Survey on FirmsInnovation and Technological Behavior (NSFITB) is a survey
developed by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC) for the 1992-1996
and 1998-2001 periods. It surveys a sample of more than 1600 industries representing over
50% of the Argentine universe of rms. While the main objective of this database is the
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gathering of information about innovation and technological behavior of Argentine rms, it
has also abundant information regarding rm characteristics (ownership, export shares and
destination, employment structure, factor intensity, etc.). Regarding standards the surveyed
rms dene the name, year and cost of the di¤erent certications attained. Moreover, the
survey has di¤erent measures of rmproductivity and each rm is compared to each most
advanced competitor in the eld in terms of a series of indicators. It also asks specic
questions as to whether innovation is devoted to improve the quality of products in order
to be able to sell in foreign markets.
6.3 The Permanent Household Survey
The Permanent Household Survey (PHS) is a National Program of Systemic and Permanent
construction of social indicators. It is developed by the National Institute of Statistics and
Census (INDEC). This program makes it possible to know about special socioeconomic and
socio-demographic characteristics of households. The PHS is a two stage random sample of
households that contains an array of personal, demographic and economic information on
individual household members. Since the beginnings in 1974 it was conducted twice a year
(in May and October) in the main urban centers of Argentina . Since 2003 it has been carried
out as a continuous survey that produces quarterly data. The les record information on
each respondents labor market status and living arrangements during the survey week as
well as the retrospective data on labor market activity during the previous month. In terms
of personal, demographic, and economic information on individual household members,
it provides the following information: labor market status (employed, unemployed or non
labor force), relation to household head, age, sex, marital status, hours worked in the survey
week, occupation, rm size and sector of activity, non labor income, schooling, number of
children, hourly wage, number of hours worked. It is not di¢ cult to join personal and
household les and to create from these joined database variables related to the household
than can inuence individual behavior towards the labor market. The original PHS had
a rotating sample design, with households (addresses, strictly speaking) in the survey for
four waves (two years) renewing the sample for each wave. The continuous survey has a
rotating sample design called 2-2-2. Households on a determined area are included in the
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sample during two consecutive quarters. Then these households are excluded for other two
quarters. Finally, those same households are included on the sample for 2 more consecutive
quarters. In this way, we can gather information from a household for about an year and a
half.
7 Results
As mentioned above, we estimated three DID equations, one for export shares, one for labor
demand and one for wages. Several controls and dependent variable specications were used.
As we will discuss below, Argentina su¤ered di¤erent shocks which could be a¤ecting its
export performance other than the change in standards: the Mexican devaluation (1994),
the Brazilian devaluation (1999) and Mexico joining the NAFTA (1993).
7.1 Impact of standards on export shares
The results for each equation can be seen in the appendix. As it was suspected, the increase
in standards stringency has a negative e¤ects on the export shares. More stringent standards
appear to reduce rmsexport shares (to the US and EU) by 33 basic points.
Results are robust to di¤erent specications of the equations we estimated. We used
di¤erent controls: industry export shares (Industry export share), investment in capital
goods over total sales (KIsales), skilled labor over total labor (NTechNtotal), sales per
employee, index of wages per employee, export of the industry to the EU and US (XEUUS),
real exchange rate (TCR) and industry share of employment (SecN1).
7.2 Impact of standards on labor demand and its composition
For our labor demand equation, we have three di¤erent specications for the dependent
variables: number of employees and two specication for the ratio of white collar employees
to total workers ((NTechNtotal) and (NProfNtotal). The change in standard stringency
has no e¤ects on the total number of employees, but a positive e¤ect on white collar/blue
collar employment ratio in the exporting rms. In particular, for the rms exporting to
the US and EU, more stringent standards appear to have increased their share of technical
17
personnel.
7.3 Impact on wages
In order to measure the e¤ect of standard stringency on wages, we use as dependent variable
wages per employee. While the ideal dependent variable would be wages for each kind of
workers (white and blue collar), we do not have such information. The overall e¤ect of
standard stringency on average wages is negative, contradicting our predictions. We believe
that such e¤ect can be consistent with bargaining theories where a lower net producer price
is passed on to workers in the form of lower wages.
7.4 Competing explanations
It is very hard to argue that the change in standard stringency analyzed above is the only
economic shock that might be a¤ecting export performance su¤ered by Argentina in the
period considered. Argentina su¤ered many shocks which could have a¤ected exports.
More specically, Argentina was hit by the Mexican and Brazilian crisis and the entrance
of Mexico to the NAFTA.
To account for the di¤erent shocks, we used diverse controls in our regressions. We
used the real exchange rate faced by each sector. An increase in the real exchange rate,
TCR, (accounting for nominal devaluation, lowering or increasing tari¤s, etc.) might be
a¤ecting export shares other than the change in standards. Industry export share was also
considered, since for Argentina, sectors which are export oriented are in general more pro-
ductive and better prepared to face negative shocks. Capital and skill intensity (KIsales and
NTechTotal) are used to account for the fact that the same increase in standard stringency,
will a¤ect less to industries that are more capital and or skill intensive. Finally, sales per
employee and wages per employee are used as proxies for rms productivity.
If any of the above mentioned shocks were driving our change in export shares to indus-
trialized countries, we would have di¤erent results. For example, a devaluation in Brazil will
result in a loss of competitiveness of Argentine products which will reduce export shares,
skill ratio and average wages in exporting industries. The same would happen for Mexicos
devaluation and for the Mexico entering the NAFTA.
18
8 Conclusions
Our results go in line with our priors. An increase in standard stringency reduces export
shares of the already exporting rms. Conditional on reducing export shares, the rms
which export increase their relative demand for more skilled workers. Moreover, average
wages per employee are reduced. However, the fact that demand for skilled labor increases
while average wages are reduced deserves further examination, since such results are coun-
terintuitive. Such result might be explained by bargaining theories, where a lower net
producer price due to the increase in costs is passed on to workers in the form of lower
wages.
Our results represent a contribution to existing empirical research about the e¤ects
of standards on trade. One of the severe limitations to test our hypotheses is the data
availability. Our work suggest the need of more e¤ort in gathering rm level micro data
in order to measure the e¤ect of standards on trade, employment and wages to be able to
formulate policy recommendations.
We could not derive poverty and income distribution implications with our data, but
there is evidence which links positively trade and poverty reduction, so any policy which
discourages exports will a¤ect poverty at some point. As far as income distribution is
concerned, evidence is mixed.
For the specic case of Argentina, where the gap between wages, returns to schooling
and informality between workers in the exporting and non exporting sector is widening,
facilitating the compliance with standards of Argentine rms should be a top priority in
the agenda.
Finally, technical assistance from OECD countries to developing countries with the
objective of helping the later to comply with the standards is also a valuable policy recom-
mendation.
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Table 1: Investment
Purpose (in %) 2001(1) 2002 2003 2004
Improve product or service quality 43.6 32.9 29.7 17.9
Input optimization 17.3 20.7 18.0 20.6
Penetrate foreign markets 6.4 12.8 11.5 9.8
Increase production 16.7 17.6 27.9 38.3
Reduce non wage labor cost 7.7 7.5 4.7 3.7
Increase internal market share 3.2 5.7 8 9.7
Reduction in the number of hours worked 0 1.9 0.2 0
Reduction in the number of employees 5.1 1.1 0 0
(1): up to December
Source: Indec
Table 2: Incremental cost of Standard Compliance.
Industry Mean* Std. Dev
Bectrical and electrical equipment 2.4 4.28
Fabricated metal 11.21 25.66
Industrial machinery and equipment 1.81 2.14
Industrial or agricultural chemical 3.17 4.01
Instruments, photographic, optical, watches 0.26 -
Leather and leather products 1.98 2.49
Paper and allied products 1.28 1.60
Printer and publishing products 0.29 -
Processed food and tabacco 4.61 10.61
Rubber and plastic products 5.2 6.18
Telecommunications and terminal equipment 1.57 1.96
Textiles and apparel 2.73 6.80
Transportation equipment, auto parts, dealers 4.18 8.27
Lumber, wood and furniture 0.45 0.27
Construction and construction related services 1.43 1.09
Primary metal and metalic ores 11.27 20.48
Miscellaneous manufactured commodities 20.89 50.51
Drug and liquor 3.67 3.82
Material 1.99 1.12
Other services 0.26 0.33
Other 4.6 -
Source: World Bank
% of sale price.
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Table 3: % Incremental costs relative to Sale price.
Industry Costs
Chemical (granulated enzymes) 0%
Metals (aluminum and steel ) 0 - 4.20%
Car parts (shock-absorbers and valves) 0 - 4.66%
Electrical machinery (digital scales and tness equipment) 4.30 - 8.33%
Dairy products 1.77 - 3.19%
Shoes and Footwear 10.73%
Processed foods (juices and canned products) 2.44%
Oil rening 2.50%
Source: IERAL Survey
Table 4: Statistics
Variable
Mean Wages
(2001 AR$)
Non-exporting 506.37
sd (560)
Exporting 589.59
sd (617)
Labor Informality*
Non-exporting 41%
Exporting 32%
Source: PHS
Labor informality is measured as % of employees without Social Security Contributions.
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Table 5: Mincer equations.
Dep. var.
Log income Non-exporting Exporting
schooling 0.064 0.250
(0.04) (0.02)
experience 0.053 0.067
(0.02) (0.01)
experience2 -0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00)
size 0.091 0.010
(0.07) (0.04)
Sex -0.054 -0.337
(0.12) (0.08)
civil 0.192 0.315
(0.12) (0.08)
cons 4.245 3.755
(0.38) (0.24)
Nobs 602 1444
R-squared 0.0325 0.11
Source: PIH
Notes: Sex=1 female, Civil=1 married, size=1 more than 100 employees
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